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RESPONDING TO ENVIRONMENTAL
INJUSTICE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND
AMERICAN FEDERAL INSTITUTIONAL AND
SYSTEMIC BARRIERS TO PRIVATE REDRESS




This article discusses the use of private action in federal institutions
for relief from disparate racial impacts. The courts have eliminated
consideration of § 602 disparate impact regulations as the basis for a
private right of action challenging environmental harms. Legislative
action seems unlikely in this era of gridlock and partisan polarization.
Agency action seems to offer the most avenues for consideration of en-
vironmental justice concerns. However, agencies are bureaucratic and
subject to election results, Congressional oversight and budgetary limi-
tations, and backlogs of determination of environmental justice
complaints. Deeply rooted systemic institutional racism further con-
strains possible reforms to the federal branches of government.
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I. BACKGROUND – IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM – ESTABLISHING THAT
DISPARATE ENVIRONMENT IMPACTS EXIST
IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES
Environmental justice seeks a remedy to the disparate impacts
on minority communities of environmental harms and degradation, re-
sulting from governmental and business decisions regarding
environmental matters. “ ‘Environmental Justice’ is the fair treatment
and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, na-
tional origin, or income with respect to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations,
and policies.”1 The history of environmental justice is well known: pro-
tests in Warren County, North Carolina, first brought environmental
impacts suffered in minority communities to national attention.2 Stud-
ies made after the Warren County events by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO)3 and the United Church of Christ (UCC)4
(updated in 20075) established that environmental harms are dispro-
1. What is Environmental Justice?, EPA.GOV (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.epa.gov/envi
ronmentaljustice.
2. Paul Mohai, David Pellow & J. Timmons Roberts, Environmental Justice, 34 ANN.
REV. ENV’T & RES. 405, 406-07, 410, 422 (2009).
3. Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation With Racial and
Economic Status of Surrounding Communities, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
http://archive.gao.gov/d48t13/121648.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2013).
4. BENJAMIN F. CHAVIS, JR. & CHARLES LEE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION
FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT
ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS
WASTES SITES, ix (1987).
5. BULLARD ET AL., TOXIC WASTES AND RACE AT TWENTY: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST JUSTICE & WITNESS MINISTRIES (2007).
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portionately located in poor and minority communities. Different
theories have been developed for the reasons underlying disparate im-
pacts in minority neighborhoods. Some studies assert that non-
minorities have more economic resources, are more mobile, and are
more likely to move from locations with environmental impacts.6 How-
ever, most studies indicate that the environmental harms are placed in
existing minority neighborhoods and that the disparate impact comes
not from non-minorities moving out of a neighborhood but from the ini-
tial siting decision.7 Interestingly, as knowledge has increased
regarding environmental risks, the initial siting of environmental
harms into minority neighborhoods has increased.8 Statistical studies9
and meta-studies10 confirm that the siting of environmental harms or
risk exposure to pollutants are correlated to race, as demonstrated by
the location, density and proximity of such risks in minority communi-
ties.11 Such placement leads to institutionalized racism.12 Improved
modeling and statistical techniques in more recent studies found
strong correlation of race to placement of environmental risks.13
The right to be free of racial discrimination from agencies and
programs that receive federal funding was set forth in the Civil Rights
Act.14 In light of clear evidence that disparate racial impact of environ-
mental harms does exist, which presumably would violate the Civil
Rights Act, the efficacy of action by aggrieved persons seeking remedy
of disparate environmental impacts within the United States federal
institutions of the courts, the legislative branch, and executive agen-
6. Laura Pulido, Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban
Development in Southern California, 90 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 12
(2000).
7. Manuel Pastor, Jr., Jim Sadd & John Hipp, Which Came First? Toxic Facilities,
Minority Move-In, and Environmental Justice, 23 J. OF URB. AFF. 1 (2001).
8. Mohai et al., supra note 2, at 413.
9. Mohai et al., supra note 2, at 417; Raquel Penderhughes, The Impact of Race on
Environmental Quality: An Empirical and Theoretical Discussion, 39 SOC. PERSP. 231, 235-
37, 243 (1996); Phillip H. Pollock & M. Elliot Vittas, Who Bears the Burden of
Environmental Pollution? Race, Ethnicity, and Environmental Equity in Florida, 76 SOC.
SCI. Q. 294, 303 (1995); Evan J. Ringquist, Equity and the Distribution of Environmental
Risk: The Case of TRI Facilities, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 811, 818 (1997).
10. Evan J. Ringquist, Assessing Evidence of Environmental Inequities: A Meta-
Analysis, 24 J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 223, 224, 233, 235, 241 (2005).
11. Ringquist, supra note 9, at 822.
12. Penderhughes, supra note 9, at 233; David Schlosberg, Theorizing Environmental
Justice: The Expanding Sphere of Discourse, 22 ENVTL. POL. 37, 39 (2013).
13. Jayajot Chakraberty, Cancer Risk from Exposure to Hazardous Air Pollutants:
Spatial and Social Inequities in Tampa Bay, Florida, 22 INT’L J. OF ENVTL. HEALTH RES.
165, 178, 180 (2012).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2014).
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cies is now assessed. Historical systemic racism is also considered as a
factor and limitation for the possibility of institutional action and
reform.
II. TITLE VI – THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT – § 601 AND § 602
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196515 is central to the under-
standing of possible citizen action in federal institutions to ameliorate
the effects of disparate racial effects. The Act prohibits intentional ra-
cial discrimination by any group or program receiving federal funds16
and further requires all federal agencies to implement regulations to
avoid disparate racial impacts resulting from agency actions.17 Title VI
is made applicable to state and local agency action by the 14th Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States.18 These statutory
provisions have long provided that there is a private cause of action for
intentional discriminatory actions pursuant to § 601.19 The history of
private individuals seeking governmental relief through litigation, leg-
15. Id.
16. “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id.
17. § 2000d-1 provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract
other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to
effectuate the provisions of section 601 with respect to such program or activity by
issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent
with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance
in connection with which the action is taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall
become effective unless and until approved by the President. Compliance with any
requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination
of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any
recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after
opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such
termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part
thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made and, shall be
limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such
noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law:
Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the department or
agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to
comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured
by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or
continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed
pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file with
the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the
program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the
grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until thirty days have
elapsed after the filing of such report.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
19. See discussion infra Part IV.
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islative accomplishment, and agency action for disparate racial
impacts of governmental actions has been much more problematic.
Having set forth the applicable statutory provisions, this paper now
considers the application of the statute for environmental matters in
the federal judicial, legislative, and executive agency contexts.
III. JUDICIAL ACTION - PRE-SANDOVAL LITIGATION REGARDING
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION FOR DISPARATE IMPACTS
RESULTING FROM GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS
The Supreme Court of the United States has demonstrated an
increasing reluctance over the past twenty-five years to find a private
right of action to prevent judicially the disparate racial impact of gov-
ernmental actions or third party actions receiving federal funds. Initial
cases seemed to permit judicially created private rights of action. The
Supreme Court has examined the contours of Title VI.20 The majority
decision in Lau v. Nichols held that § 601 prohibited disparate racial
impact.21 At least three justices went further and found that regula-
tions approved pursuant to § 602 would also create privately
enforceable rights.22 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,23 the Court
considered Title IX24 of the Educational Act.25 Analogizing Title IX to
§ 601 of the Civil Rights Act, the Court held that Title IX created indi-
vidual standing to bring a private right of action to sue for violations of
Title IX, notwithstanding the lack of express provision therefore in the
legislation.26 Early cases were open to the idea of inferring a private
right of action from the context of enactment and the legislative history
of the statute.27
20. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
24. Compare § 2000d with 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). “No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. §1681 (a) (2014). The statutory language is identical to
§ 601, Title VI, Civil Rights Act, except for the substitution of gender bias for racial bias.
25. See 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
26. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717.
27. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Cort decision set forth a four prong test to
determine whether a private right of action could be inferred in the absence of a specific
legislative statement either specifically creating or specifically rejecting a private right of
action. (a) is the movant one of class for which the statute was intended; (b) indications of
legislative intent (c) would the private right of action be consistent with the legislative
intent of the statute; and (d) is this area traditionally left to the states so that a federal
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Despite this early expansive reading of rights existing as a re-
sult of federal legislation, the more recent history of decisions from the
Supreme Court of the United States showed a growing reluctance for
recognition of individual private causes of action for anything other
than demonstrable personal actual prejudice, absent a clear and spe-
cific legislation statement creating such an individual right of action.
The Court first determined that the equal protection provisions of the
14th amendment did not create a private right of action.28
However, the existence of private rights of action pursuant to
regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602 and how to consider dispa-
rate racial impact of governmental actions continued to concern the
Court. In Regents of University of California v. Bakke,29 the Supreme
Court considered whether quotas for racially disadvantaged applicants
to medical school violated the equal protection rights of non-minority
applicants denied admission. The University of California set aside a
specific number of seats for minority admission to medical school.30
The Court held that such minority-designated admission seats were
prohibited.31 However, no one theory received a majority of support.
Five justices determined that the quotas were unlawful and Mr. Bakke
must be admitted, while a different set of five justices stated that any
consideration of race is prohibited.32 Interestingly, the Bakke Court did
not reach the question regarding whether or not a private right of ac-
tion existed under § 602 and assumed, without deciding, that such a
right did exist.33 The Bakke decision did permit consideration of race in
admissions to correct previous discrimination, so long as specific quo-
tas were not utilized to correct the previous discrimination.34
action would be inappropriate. Id. at 78. The Cort decision held that the federal election
statutes did not contemplate private enforcement. Id. at 78.
28. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Both cases held that to invoke the 14th
Amendment, litigants must demonstrate actual discrimination, not simply a disparate
racial impact. Id.
29. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
30. Id. at 269-70.
31. Id. at 271.
32. Id. at 271, 272.
33. Id. at 283-84. The concurrence of Justice White indicated that four of the justices
stated that such a right did exist, and four assumed so for the purposes of the decision.
Justice White, citing Cort, indicated that such a right of action did not exist. Id. at 379-81.
34. Id. at 317-18. The concurrence of Justice Brennen, joined by Justices White,
Marshall, and Blackmun stated:
“[b]ut this should not and must not mask the central meaning of today’s opinions:
Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any
racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial
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The Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City
decision determined that compensatory relief—not set forth specifi-
cally in the applicable statute—would not be a permitted remedy for
racial bias in police promotions.35 Only the statutorily provided declar-
atory and injunction relief would be granted.36 However, the Court still
struggled with whether the disparate impact regulations required by
§ 602 created a private right of action for enforcement.37 The Court
next considered § 602 private actions in Alexander v. Choate.38 In
Choate, the Court held that state regulations limiting the number of
in-hospital days covered each year by Medicare did not violate Title VI,
even though handicapped persons might need more hospital days each
year, because the regulation was neutral on its face, and both handi-
capped and non-handicapped persons were equally affected.39 The
Choate decision recognized that the Guardians Assn. case did not have
a majority decision regarding whether there was a private right of ac-
tion pursuant to § 602 regulations, and further indicated that the
Guardians Assn. decision could be read to permit disparate impact
analysis.40 However, with the passage of time, and a new line-up of
Justices, the Court finally determined conclusively whether or not reg-
ulations promulgated pursuant to § 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act created an individual cause of action for disparate racial impacts.
IV. JUDICIAL ACTION - ALEXANDER V. SANDOVAL – THE END OF AN
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR DISPARATE IMPACT
In 1990, the State of Alabama enacted legislation making En-
glish the official language of the State.41 The motor licensing agency
determined that, based upon the English-only requirement, all appli-
cants for driver’s licenses must take the test in English.42 Mr.
Sandoval challenged the English-only driving test as having a discrim-
inatory disparate racial impact, as prohibited by § 602. The Supreme
Court of the United States in Alexander v. Sandoval, in a 5 to 4 deci-
prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative,
or administrative bodies with competence to act in this area.” Id. at 325.
35. 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983).
36. Id.
37. A three Justice opinion indicated that Bakke did not set limits on considering
disparate impacts. Id. at 589-90.
38. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
39. Id. at 302.
40. Id. at 292-94.
41. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001).
42. Id.
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sion, determined that regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602 to
prohibit disparate impacts of agency action did not create a private
right of action.43 The majority reasoned:
1. § 601 of the Civil Rights Act specifically provided that pri-
vate citizens could bring litigation alleging intentional
discrimination.44
2. § 602 of the Civil Rights Act required federal governmental
agencies to implement regulations regarding disparate racial
impacts from agency actions.45
3. § 602 did not provide for a private right of action. As a fur-
ther indication that no private right of action was created,
§ 602 did not provide for any private remedy.46
4. Private rights of action must be specifically created by the
legislative branch.47
5. The regulations promulgated under § 602 cannot create a
private right of action because regulations may only imple-
ment legislative enactments, and cannot expand the
legislation created.48
6. Therefore, there is no private right of action to enforce the
regulations of any agency regarding disparate impacts
promulgated by the agency as required by § 602.49
The majority saw Bakke, Guardians Assn., and Choate as re-
jecting the Lau decision and, therefore, consistent with the majority
opinion in rejecting any private right of action created by § 602 regula-
tions.50 The dissent, however, opined that the majority opinion
misstated and misinterpreted the pre-Sandoval cases.51 The previous
cases, according to the dissent, did in fact permit private rights of ac-
tion as a reasonable statutory construction by the Court, not as an
impermissible policy decision.52 Frustrated by the majority specifically
foreclosing individual litigants from bringing § 602 actions, the dissent
invited future litigants to bring actions for disparate racial impacts
43. Id. at 293.
44. Id. at 280.
45. Id. at 281-82.
46. Id. at 289.
47. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286.
48. Id. at 291.
49. Id. at 293.
50. Id. at 290.
51. Id. at 294-95.
52. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 296-98.
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pursuant to § 1983.53 Notwithstanding the strong dissent, the Sando-
val decision has effectively ended individual actions to enforce § 602
regulations and has brought into doubt any possibility of a federal
court created private right of action.
V. § 1983 LITIGATION – INVITATION FROM THE SANDOVAL DISSENT
The Sandoval dissent invited litigants to bring actions for dis-
parate racial impacts pursuant to § 1983,54 which provides:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,
except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief
shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or de-
claratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Colum-
bia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.55
The availability of § 1983 relief challenging environmental action spe-
cifically for disparate racial impact was considered in South Camden
Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion.56 The plaintiffs, the South Camden group, brought an action to
block the issuance of a permit authorizing a cement company to oper-
ate a plant alleged to have an adverse and disparate racial impact on a
local community.57 The trial court initially found disparate impact and
granted a temporary injunction against the issuance of the permit.58
After the District Court entry of the injunction, the Supreme Court is-
sued the Sandoval decision. In response to the decision, the trial court
found that, notwithstanding Sandoval, there was a private right of ac-
tion for enforcement under § 1983.59 The Third Circuit reversed,
applied Sandoval, and held that § 1983 did not contain specific legisla-
tive language establishing a private right of action; therefore, private
53. Id. at 300 n.6.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2014).
55. Id.
56. 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001).
57. Id. at 774.
58. Id. at 776.
59. Id.
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rights of action regarding environmental disparate impacts did not ex-
ist pursuant to § 1983.60
The Supreme Court has not directly considered § 1983 private
rights of action since Sandoval. Post-Sandoval, however, the Supreme
Court has reaffirmed its reluctance to establish a private right of ac-
tion to enforce any legislation, absent a specific legislatively created
private right. Although not considering either racial impact or environ-
mental laws, the Supreme Court held that an educational
confidentiality statute did not create a private right to sue for alleged
violations in Gonzaga University v. Doe.61 In light of Sandoval and
Gonzaga, § 1983 private right of action litigation would seem to have
little chance of Supreme Court approval. The current Court should be
expected to take a constrained view of the Court’s role in legislative
matters in the foreseeable future. Court-created rights for a private
right of action under any legal theory, absent specific Congressional
creation, are unlikely.
VI. JUDICIAL ACTION – OTHER OPENINGS FOR LITIGATION SUCCESS?
A. Diminished Value of Property Interests – Title IX Fair Housing –
§ 1982 – Taking of Property
Racial discrimination is prohibited in property ownership and
leasing.62 Official government actions that disproportionately impact
the property rights of citizens of color may be subject to litigation at-
tack.63 Private parties may assert rights pursuant to § 1982.64 Under
60. Id. at 791.
61. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2014) states,“[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” See also Title VIII, of the
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A § 3604(a)-(b) (2014), stating, in part:
“[I]t shall be unlawful— (a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide
offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
or national origin.”
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale
or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith. . .because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
Discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2014).
63. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (finding real property restrictive
covenants prohibiting sales to African Americans unconstitutional).
64. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\9-2\fam102.txt unknown Seq: 11 17-APR-15 8:33
2014 RESPONDING TO ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE 427
these circumstances, disparate impacts on private property rights
would seem to be a cognizable action. However, even prior to Sandoval,
the Supreme Court demonstrated its reluctance to overturn govern-
mental actions with a disparate racial impact on property values and
upheld governmental actions based upon municipal regulatory pow-
ers.65 In response to § 1982 statutory and 13th Amendment
constitutional challenges to a road closure that impacted a minority
neighborhood, the Court held that the action of the City of Memphis
was not by context or pretext racially motivated, but was within the
municipality’s power to regulate traffic.66 The Court stated:
“The argument that the closing violates the Amendment must
therefore rest, not on the actual consequences of the closing, but
rather on the symbolic significance of the fact that most of the driv-
ers who will be inconvenienced by the action are black. But the
inconvenience of the drivers is a function of where they live and
where they regularly drive-not a function of their race; the hazards
and the inconvenience that the closing is intended to minimize are
a function of the number of vehicles involved, not the race of their
drivers or of the local residents. Almost any traffic regulation-
whether it be a temporary detour during construction, a speed
limit, a one-way street, or a no-parking sign-may have a differential
impact on residents of adjacent or nearby neighborhoods. Because
urban neighborhoods are so frequently characterized by a common
ethnic or racial heritage, a regulation’s adverse impact on a particu-
lar neighborhood will often have a disparate effect on an
identifiable ethnic or racial group. To regard an inevitable conse-
quence of that kind as a form of stigma so severe as to violate the
Thirteenth Amendment would trivialize the great purpose of that
charter of freedom. Proper respect for the dignity of the residents of
any neighborhood requires that they accept the same burdens as
well as the same benefits of citizenship regardless of their racial or
ethnic origin.
This case does not disclose a violation of any of the enabling legisla-
tion enacted by Congress pursuant to §2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment. To decide the narrow constitutional question
presented by this record we need not speculate about the sort of
impact on a racial group that might be prohibited by the Amend-
ment itself. We merely hold that the impact of the closing of West
Drive on nonresidents of Hein Park is a routine burden of citizen-
ship; it does not reflect a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.”67
The City of Memphis case does indicate that the Court is not reaching
the circumstances under which disparate racial impacts would create a
65. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
66. Id. at 127.
67. Id. at 128-9.
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cognizable action under § 1982 or the federal constitution,68 thereby
leaving an opening for further litigation efforts. However, § 1982 does
not set forth a specific private right of action for disparate racial im-
pact.69 In light of the Sandoval decision, coupled with the absence of a
specific private right of action for disparate racial impacts, a citizen
asserting § 1982 protection would be required to establish actual dis-
criminatory intent.70 Therefore, § 1982 remains an unlikely vehicle to
reassert disparate racial impact analysis into federal judicial cases.71
However, property ownership in minority communities may
open another avenue of court challenges to environmental decisions
from governmental agencies and policies receiving federal funding.
Constitutional “taking of property” arguments were not considered in
the City of Memphis case. However, individual citizens could argue a
complete or partial taking of property as a result of environmental pol-
icy actions, such as the siting of a waste disposal plant. The evidence
necessary for such an eminent domain action would not emphasize the
racial composition of the neighborhood. An aggrieved party would have
to establish the value of the property before and after the environmen-
tal policy implementation; and that difference would be the “taking” for
which compensation would be sought.72 The racially disparate impact
would underlie such actions, but would not be a legal basis asserted for
relief for a neighborhood suffering the disparate impact of the environ-
mental policy decision.
B. Private Right of Action Statutes
Specific federal environmental statutes provide for a private en-
forcement right of action.73 For example, the Clean Air Act (CAA)74
68. Id. at 121, 128-9.
69. See 42 U.S.C. §1982.
70. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275.
71. Consistent with the equal protection discussion, 14th Amendment review of
governmental impacts on property requires a specific discriminatory intent, as the 14th
Amendment is not activated for a disparate impact on property rights. See Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. 252; Davis, 426 U.S. 229.
72. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
Regulatory action resulting in permanent placement on the property, e.g., telegraph,
telephone, and cable lines, would be a “taking” requiring compensation. Id. For
environmental justice actions, the argument could be made that the placing of
environmental hazards increased exposures and thereby constituted a similar permanent
placement of hazards on the actual property.
73. See EPA, PLAN EJ 2014: LEGAL TOOLS (2014), available at  http://www.epa.gov/com
pliance/ej/resources/policy/plan-ej-2014/ej-legal-tools.pdf [hereinafter PLAN EJ 2014].
74. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7401 (1970).
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provides for a private right of action. Private rights of action in such
statutes include forcing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
perform a required function. This is important as a legal theory; if EPA
does not consider disparate racial impact of an agency action (required
to have regulations pursuant to § 602), then there is a private cause of
action for enforcement of disparate racial impact under CAA. EPA has
actively promoted the use of federal environmental statutes for private
individuals by providing detailed analysis of the legal remedies availa-
ble in specific private right of action statutes.75 However, there
continues to be reluctance by the Circuit Courts to expand private citi-
zen actions under the CAA;76 the same reluctance presumably would
exist under other environmental statutes with a specific private right
of action.
VII. A FINAL THOUGHT ABOUT JUDICIAL ACTION – THE NEED FOR
MORE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
Sandoval appears to end § 602 relief for private claims of dispa-
rate racial impacts. However, social science research may provide a
basis for future litigation challenging decisions and actions with harm-
ful environmental impacts on a racially discriminatory basis. Certain
studies have found actual discrimination in governmental environmen-
tal actions.77 Improved methodological techniques78 and meta-
studies79 are establishing strong statistical correlations between race
and environmental siting and risk decisions. If such research and sta-
tistical methodology continues to develop, § 601 arguments of actual
discrimination may be possible. Proof of intent is required to provide a
level of certainty, and rigorous quantitative social science methods can
and do provide the same thing—measurable certainty.
75. See PLAN EJ 2014, supra note 73.
76. See, e.g., McEvoy v. IEI Barge Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding
there is no private right of action under the CAA to enforce State of Illinois legislative
provisions).
77. See Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53
SOC. INQUIRY 273 (1983) (finding actual discrimination in placement of wastes established);
see also Mohai et al., supra note 2, at 409.
78. Chakraberty, supra note 13, at 178, 180 (discussing quantitative geo-statistical
analysis and research relative to environmental justice studies).
79. Meta-studies combine numerous empirical studies on a subject, through
statistically recognized methodology that “normalize” the empirical results from each study,
allowing a further statistical analysis of the results across studies. See generally Ringquist,
supra note 10, at 224, 233, 235, 241.
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Further, Bakke does leave open consideration of racial factors
(while prohibiting mandatory quotas) to correct past prejudices.80 This
social science research could establish the long-term land use, zone,
placement, density, and other factors that underlie 100 years of deci-
sions regarding placement of environmental hazards into minority
communities. Social science research is recognized as valid evidence to
be used under the National Environmental Policy Act to determine en-
vironmental impacts and, therefore, creates legislative authority to
utilize research that establishes disparate racial impacts.81 As the
placements occurred in existing minority communities, and the dispa-
rate impact was not caused by minorities moving into communities
after the placement of the environmental hazard,82 this evidence
shows the equivalent of intentional prejudice as well as the prejudicial
impacts of a new placement into a minority neighborhood. Driver’s li-
censes are a state privilege; clean air and water, healthy food, and lack
of exposure to toxic chemicals are important for actual life. There is no
history of tests, taxes, or other impediments to members of a certain
community to obtaining driver’s licenses, so that the “English-Only”
requirement could be seen as neutral. In comparison, there were such
intentional and actual impacts in voting, housing, and placement of
environmental hazards. State action regarding driver’s licenses—in-
deed, Sandoval itself—could be distinguished from a private action
challenge to environmental matters since the prejudice from the envi-
ronmental decision would be yet another example in a long history of
environmental prejudice as established in social science research. En-
vironmental prejudice, therefore, is arguably more akin to voting
prejudice. A long history of environmental prejudice, either intentional
or resultant disparate impact, should be granted Court recognition and
protection. Consequently, the social science research that finds such
prejudice provides an appropriate avenue for individuals to assert
their claims.
VIII. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Congress has the power to pass legislation in response to a deci-
sion of the Supreme Court interpreting a federal statute, in an attempt
80. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18.
81. See 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(A) (2014) (“[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government shall—
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of
the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in
decisionmaking [sic] which may have an impact on man’s environment.”).
82. See supra notes 2, 6-7, 9-13, 77 (discussing cited research studies).
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to avoid or change the judicial decision.83 In the aftermath of the San-
doval decision, and in the face of apparent reluctance from federal
courts to find a private right of action for racial disparate impacts
under § 1983, legislative action could make Congressional intent clear
regarding private rights of action, and address specifically the holdings
of the Sandoval, South Camden, and Gonzaga decisions. Calls for legis-
lative action have requested that Congress enact specific revisions to
statutory law to confirm that Congress intends a private right of action
for disparate racial impact pursuant to regulations promulgated pur-
suant to both § 602 of the Civil Rights Act and § 1983.84 Senator
Robert Menendez (D-NJ) introduced a bill in the 109th Congress in
2006 entitled the “Environmental Justice Enforcement Act of 2006.”85
The legislation was reintroduced in the 110th Congress.86 Other than
re-titling the Act to reflect the changed calendar year from 2006 to
2008,87 the two Senate bills were identical. Both bills were sharply crit-
ical of the Sandoval decision, introduced Congressional findings that
the Supreme Court had misinterpreted the legislative history of Con-
gressional action, and proposed that Congress always intended that
private actions could be brought in court for disparate racial impacts of
governmental actions or actions by agencies and programs receiving
federal funding.88 The “Environmental Justice Enforcement Act” ad-
ded a specific definition to § 601 of the Civil Rights Act that defined
“discrimination” subject to § 601 enforcement to include a disparate ra-
cial impact89 and provided a specific right of private action pursuant to
83. See generally Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. 597 (1986) (following
the Supreme Court’s determination that disability laws did not apply to air travel, Congress
subsequently passed 49 U.S.C. § 41705, legislation designed to make it clear that disability
discrimination prohibitions applied to air travel).
84. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NOT IN MY BACKYARD: EXECUTIVE ORDER
12,898 AND TITLE VI AS TOOLS FOR ACHIEVING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ch. 8 (2003),
available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/envjust/ch8.htm. Recommendation 2.1 states, “In
light of the Sandoval, South Camden, and Gonzaga decisions, Congress should pass a Civil
Rights Restoration Act to clearly and unambiguously provide for a private right of action for
disparate impact claims under § 602 of Title VI and § 1983.” Id.
85. See S. 4009, 109th Cong. §1 (2006).
86. See S. 2918, 110th Cong. (2008).
87. Id. § 1.
88. Id. § 2(1), (4); see also, S. 4009, 109th Cong. § 2(1), (4) (2006).
89. See S. 2918, 110th Cong. (2008) (providing the following definition for disparate
impact:
(b)(1)(A) Discrimination (including exclusion from participation and denial of
benefits) based on disparate impact is established under this title only if—(i) a
person aggrieved by discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin
(referred to in this title as an ‘aggrieved person’) demonstrates that an entity subject
to this title (referred to in this title as a ‘covered entity’) has a policy or practice that
causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, or national origin and the
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§ 602, including any agency regulation promulgated pursuant to
§ 602.90 The proposed legislation would add a new § 602A to Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act, setting forth the damages private citizens could
recover.91 The proposed legislation specifically included agency regula-
tions in the disparate impact discrimination definition and in the
provisions explicitly creating private rights of action for disparate im-
pacts.92 Both bills were referred to committee, and therewith died.
Even more limited legislative action to promote environmental
justice has failed. Over twenty years, proposed environmental justice
legislation to collect information on areas of environmental impact and
to require nondiscriminatory compliance with environmental laws,93 to
prohibit the siting of waste disposal sites in environmental disadvan-
taged locations,94 and to codify Executive Order 12898—and require
EPA implementation thereof—95 have all died in committee. While
there is certainly demand from civil rights and environmental activists
for legislative action,96 in the present political climate of significant
covered entity fails to demonstrate that the challenged policy or practice is related to
and necessary to achieve the nondiscriminatory goals of the program or activity
alleged to have been operated in a discriminatory manner . . . .
See S. 4009, 109th Cong. §3 (2006) (using identical language).
90. The proposed private right of action pursuant to § 602 as set forth in S. 2918, 110th
Cong. § 4 (2008) is the creation of new subsection (b) to the said section, which states, “(b)
Any person aggrieved by the failure of a covered entity to comply with this title, including
any regulation promulgated pursuant to this title, may bring a civil action in any Federal or
State court of competent jurisdiction to enforce such person’s rights.’’ See S. 4009, 109th
Cong. §4 (2006) (using identical language).
91. S. 2918, 110th Cong. § 5 (2008) (providing:
SEC. 602A. ACTIONS BROUGHT BY AGGRIEVED PERSONS.
(a) CLAIMS BASED ON PROOF OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION.—In an
action brought by an aggrieved person under this title against a covered entity who
has engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not a practice that is unlawful
because of its disparate impact) prohibited under this title (including its
implementing regulations), the aggrieved person may recover equitable and legal
relief (including compensatory and punitive damages), attorney’s fees (including
expert fees), and costs, except that punitive damages are not available against a
government, government agency, or political subdivision.
(b) CLAIMS BASED ON THE DISPARATE IMPACT STANDARD OF PROOF.—In
an action brought by an aggrieved person under this title against a covered entity
who has engaged in unlawful discrimination based on disparate impact prohibited
under this title (including its implementing regulations), the aggrieved person may
recover equitable relief, attorney’s fees (including expert fees), and costs.).
See S. 4009, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006) (using identical language).
92. See S. 2918; S. 4009; S. 4009; S. 2918; S. 4009.
93. See H.R. 2105, 103rd Cong. (1993); S. 1161, 103rd Cong. (1993).
94. See H.R. 1924, 103rd Cong. (1993).
95. See, e.g., S. 642, 109th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1103, 109th Cong. (2007).
96. See supra note 84.
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challenges to environmental science,97 sharp ideological and political
divides amongst voters,98 and high levels of divergence between legis-
lators from each of the two political parties in support of
environmental issues,99 legislative action to create an explicit private
right of action for judicial redress of disparate racial environmental im-
pacts seems unlikely. While legislative action appears foreclosed in the
current political climate, activist attention may turn to federal admin-
istrative agencies to remedy racial disparate impacts of environmental
actions.
IX. ADMINSTRATIVE ACTION
Activist action to assure environmental justice may be most ef-
fective in the executive agency context.100 As previously set forth, § 602
of Title VI of the Civil Rights does require federal agencies to promul-
gate regulations that prohibit disparate racial impacts of federal
agency action.101 EPA, as a federal agency, implemented regulations to
require consideration of disparate racial impacts of all statutes admin-
istered by EPA.102
97. Riley E. Dunlap, Peter J. Jacques, & Mark Freeman, The Organization of Denial:
Conservative Think Tanks and Environmental Skepticism, 17 ENVTL. POL. 349, 356-57
(2008) (discussing conservative think tanks that developed reports questioning the science
underlying the finding that human action has contributed to global warming).
98. Riley E. Dunlap, Aaron M. McCright, & Chenyang Xiao, Politics and Environment
in America: Partisan and Ideological Cleavages in Public Support for Environmentalism, 10
ENVTL. POL. 23, 42-44 (2001).
99. Charles R. Shipan & William R. Lowry, Environmental Policy and Party
Divergence in Congress, 54 POL. RES. Q. 245, 251, figure 1 (2001).
100. The 2003 United States Civil Rights Commission Report, see supra note 84,
included a recommendation that Title VI enforcement efforts be focused on agency action:
2.2 In light of the currently limited legal enforceability of disparate impact
discrimination regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI, federal agencies
providing financial assistance to state and local agencies must vigorously enforce
their existing nondiscrimination regulations by assuming greater oversight
responsibility, implementing effective policy and guidelines for administrative
enforcement of Title VI violations, and imposing appropriate penalties when
violations of Title VI occur.
As a result of the constraints of the Sandoval, South Camden, and Gonzaga decisions, and
the Commission’s Recommendation 2.1, supra note 84, and Recommendation 2.2, the report
continued:
Based on these judicial limitations, the Commission finds that both civil rights
groups and environmental justice groups are left with few legal channels for chal-
lenging disparate impact discrimination under Title VI. While § 1983 is a tool that
can be utilized in federal courts that have not barred this enforcement, much of
these groups’ civil rights enforcement attempts must be at the administrative level.
Both Recommendation 2.2 and the subsequent quote are at page 169 of the said report.
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
102. 40 C.F.R. § 7.10, et seq.
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The executive branch has historically promoted consideration of
disparate racial impact and environmental justice concerns regarding
policies, groups, and agencies receiving federal funds. President Clin-
ton signed Executive Order 12898 in 1994.103 The Executive Order
(EO) established environmental justice as the public policy of all fed-
eral agencies, stating:
To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, and consis-
tent with the principles set forth in the report on the National
Performance Review, each Federal agency shall make achieving en-
vironmental justice part of its mission by identifying and
addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies,
and activities on minority populations and low-income populations
in the United States and its territories and possessions, the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Common-
wealth of the Mariana Islands.104
EO 12898 also established an Interagency Working Group on Environ-
mental Justice105 tasked with the responsibility to ascertain and share
data regarding locations of disparate impact106 and to make agency
policies and strategies for environmental justice.107 The Interagency
Group was required to make a report to the president within fourteen
months of the issuance of EO 12898.108 Federal agencies would now be
responsible for assuring that persons were not discriminated against
based upon federal action and policies.109
Even prior to EO 12898, EPA had created an Office of Environ-
mental Justice.110 EPA’s environmental justice group was established
in response to an agency study that found significant disparate im-
pacts111 and recommended the creation of a specific part of the agency
103. Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
104. Id. at § 1-101.
105. Id. at § 1-102.
106. Id. at § 1-102(b).
107. Id. at § 1-103(a).
108. Id. at § 1-104.
109. Federal Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and
Low-Income Populations, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7630-31.
110. Originally called The Office of Environmental Equity, the division was created in
1992 and renamed the Office of Environmental Justice in 1994. Environmental Justice:
Basic Information, EPA.GOV (last updated May 24, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/environmen
taljustice/basics/ejbackground.html.
111. EPA, Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation Workgroup, Environmental
Equity: Reducing Risk for All Communities, Workgroup Report to the Administrator (June
1992), available at http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/reports/annual-pro
ject-reports/reducing_risk_com_vol1.pdf at 5,7, 32.
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for environmental justice concerns.112 Agency action and consistency,
however, is unpredictable. Even with early recognition of environmen-
tal justice issues, the implementation of § 602 regulations, and an
entire portion of the agency charged with promoting environmental
justice concerns, EPA has not consistently moved forward on environ-
mental justice and attempts to regulate adverse impacts from racial
disparate impacts.113 The Supreme Court determined in 2007 that
EPA must regulate greenhouse gases,114 but EPA is still in the
rulemaking process regarding greenhouse gases.115 The delay in imple-
menting such regulations became a political issue in the 2012
presidential election, with one Republican senator accusing President
Obama of intentionally delaying EPA regulations on greenhouse gases
for re-election concerns.116 The agency has a significant backlog of
environmental justice complaints,117 which have typically resulted in
lawsuits brought to compel agency action.118
In response to these criticisms, EPA has taken multiple agency
actions in an attempt to finalize incorporation of § 602 environmental
justice concerns into agency action. EPA has issued its Plan EJ
112. Id. at 69.
113. Government Accounting Office, “ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: EPA Needs to
Take Additional Actions to Help Ensure Effective Implementation” (October 2011) (stating
that EPA had not fully implemented the § 602 mandate). Of course, executive agencies are
also subject to political pressures and election results. Presidential administration changes
lead to more or less favorable response to environmental concern or support for EPA. Under
presidential administrations unfavorable to environmental concerns and/or protecting
marginal communities, activists should anticipate limited progress in implementing
environmental justice concerns, and indeed must be vigilant against agency attempts to roll
back or limit environmental justice policies and regulations. Congressional oversight,
approval of agency political appointments, funding, and legislative action also may
constrain the agency ability to create and implement environmental justice policies,
regulations, and enforcement when Congressional majorities, even in one house of the
legislature, are in opposition to such agency actions.
114. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
115. Climate Change: Regulatory Initiatives, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAac
tivities/regulatory-initiatives.html (last visited Jun. 3, 2014).
116. Matt Dempsey, New Senate Report Reveals Economic Pain of Obama-EPA
Regulations Put on Hold Until After the Election, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT
AND PUBLIC WORKS (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction
=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=743423EF-07B0-4DB2-BCED-4B0D9E63F
84B.
117. As of 2011, there were 38 unresolved complaints, some dating back to 1994. EPA,
OPEN COMPLAINTS REPORT (2011), available at http://epa.gov/civilrights/docs/extcom/2011_
0922_title_vi_open-complaints.pdf; see also Corbin Hair, Environmental Injustice: EPA
Neglects Discrimination Claims from Polluted Communities, THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY,
(last updated May 19, 2014), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/12/14/7660/environmen
tal-injustice-epa-neglects-discrimination-claims-polluted-communities.
118. See, e.g., Garcia v. McCarthy, No. 13–cv–03939–WHO, 2014 WL 187386 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 16, 2014).
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2014.119 The Plan EJ 2014 requires EPA to conduct a full review by
2014 of how EPA is implementing Environmental Justice issues.120
Plan EJ 2014 is not a rule or regulation, but rather a policy statement
for day-to-day implementation of environmental justice matters into
all EPA actions and decisions.121 Communities affected by environ-
mental decisions must be involved.122 Environmental justice must be
included in permitting decisions,123  compliance and enforcement deci-
sions,124 and rule making.125 EPA also has a pending plan to better
enforce Title VI regulations, entitled “Draft Supplemental Plan: Title
VI Advancing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act.”126 The draft report makes disparate impact considerations
mandatory in compliance and permitting programs.127 EPA specifically
recognizes enforcement of § 602 regulations as an important part of its
enforcement responsibilities.128 When all reports are implemented and
all regulations are promulgated (presumably by 2014), environmental
justice will finally be implemented fully by EPA, as first required by
EO 12898—20 years previously. Interestingly, EPA is also reaching
out to business interests seeking permitting and other environmental
impacts encouraging early outreach to affected communities.129 If busi-
ness interests do in fact reach out to minority communities
(presumably to streamline applications and to attempt to avoid chal-
lenges, community opposition, and subsequent litigation), there will be
an opening for communities and activists to raise environmental jus-
tice and disparate impact concerns. Further, all agency action with
environmental impacts requires an Environmental Impact Statement
119. PLAN EJ 2014, supra note 73.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, EPA.GOV http://www.epa.gov/en
vironmentaljustice/nejac/index.html#advice (last updated Sept. 11, 2013).
123. See PLAN EJ 2014, supra note 73, at 54.
124. Id. at 69.
125. Id. at 48.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 6-7.
128. See PLAN EJ 2014, supra note 75.
129. See EPA Activities to Promote Environmental Justice in the Permit Application
Process, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/region10/pdf/ej/ej_permitting_FRN_4_29.pdf; see also
Christopher J. Bosso, Rethinking the Concept of Membership in Nature Advocacy
Organizations, 31 THE POL’Y STUD. J. 397, 410 (2003) (discussing how environmental groups
are also reaching out to business interests to seek both strategic alliances and financial
support; with both the agency and interest groups seeking business support, both groups
could bring environmental justice concerns to their respective business partners).
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(EIS),130 another opportunity for disparate community and racial im-
pacts to be raised.
Once final rules and procedures are in place, as set forth in the
aforementioned Plan EJ 2014 and the specific provisions regarding Ti-
tle VI enforcement, environmental justice issues must be considered in
all permitting, siting, and enforcement actions. The new requirement
to consider § 602 concerns creates a significant opening for environ-
mental justice activists. If any federal agency fails to consider
disparate racial impacts in future matters such as issuing permits or
in an EIS, judicial challenges by private individuals or interest groups
could be pursued against EPA (or other agency or third party seeking
EPA approval for a proposed action). The failure to take a required
agency action—in this case, consideration of disparate impacts—in
that agency’s decision-making could potentially lead to judicial review
of administrative action.131 Further, if a disparate impact is presented
and ignored by the agency, that lack of consideration arguably could
constitute intentional discrimination under § 601. The Administrative
Procedures Act provides that any person affected by the adverse
agency action may bring an action.132 With this specific provision for
private rights of action, Sandoval and Gonzaga should not prohibit pri-
vate action reviews of adverse administrative agency actions and the
failure of agencies to consider environmental justice concerns in mak-
ing administrative decisions. While EPA is subject to political
constraints depending on the president in office and the make-up of
Congress, options such as the strong policy in support of environmen-
tal justice, activist involvement in agency decision making, and
litigation challenges for the failure to consider or follow § 602 regula-
tions and concerns may constitute the best avenue for utilization of
federal institutions to advance environmental justice matters.
X. REFLECTION ON STRUCTURE AND THEORY
It is worth taking a step back from the details to take stock of a
few facts that point to an “American dilemma” regarding fair treat-
ment in environmental politics and law. Observe the following:
130. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4332 (ESI requirement); see
also 40 C.F.R. § 1500-1508.
131. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500. This Act relates specifically to
review of federal agency action. Any state or local action, receiving federal funds, may be
subject to the state administrative review act, which is beyond the scope of this article.
132. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
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1. Disparate exposure of racial minorities to environmental
burdens are well documented across a deep body of re-
search.133 Environmental racism is a de facto condition in
the United States.
2. Extant environmental racism means that racial minorities
bear a disproportionate body burden that leads to predict-
ably higher levels of pre-mature death and diseases like
cancer.134
3. Extant law has thus far failed to change facts 1 and 2. Ex-
tant law and their operationalization through the
institutions of United States governance are and have been
impotent to protect citizens from significant danger.
4. Opportunities to change fact 3, such as through improved
legislation, have systematically and consistently failed, and
failed through deliberation and therefore political choice.
5. Given fact 4, we can infer that leaders of key federal institu-
tions, such as Congress and the courts, in majority, prefer
the status quo to interventions. By extension, the regrettable
preference of the republic expressed through its institutions
is to allow environmental injustice to continue.
It is conspicuous that overt individual instances of racial discrimina-
tion in housing, employment, and other areas of public life are
prohibited by the Civil Rights Act, but individuals themselves cannot
find a remedy or redress of grievance with the government for tangible
harm from acts of environmental discrimination. Consequently, the
theory of institutional racism, or institutional “racialisation,”135 is
strongly supported. This concept originated with black power activists,
Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton.136 One scholar explains:
“[i]nstitutional racism, it was argued, was deeply embedded in estab-
lished conventions in US society, which relied on anti-black attitudes
of inferiority, even if individual whites did not themselves discriminate
133. Mohai et al. supra note 2, at 405-30.
134. See, e.g., Timothy W. Collins et al., Understanding Environmental Health
Inequalities through Comparative Intracategorical Analysis: Racial/Ethnic Disparities in
Cancer Risks from Air Toxics in El Paso County, Texas. HEALTH & PLACE 17, no. 1, 335-44
(2011); Chakraberty, supra note 13 at 674-79; Robert J. Brulle & David N. Pellow,
Environmental Justice: Human Health and Environmental Inequalities ANN. REV. OF PUB.
HEALTH 27, no. 1, 103-24 (2006).
135. Coretta Phillips, Institutional Racism and Ethnic Inequalities: An Expanded
Multilevel Framework, 40(1) J. OF SOC. POL’Y 173 (2011).
136. STOKELY CARMICHAEL AND CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: POLITICS OF
LIBERATION IN AMERICA 4-5 (1967).
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against individual blacks.”137 If the courts require evidence of discrimi-
natory intent, but individual discrimination is not the principle source
of environmental discrimination, institutional remedies are required.
At the same time, if the institutional racism theory is correct, success-
fully correcting the matter will continue to face institutional
obstruction. Carmichael and Hamilton argued that while most white
citizens would never participate in a church bombing, they nonetheless
“continue to support political officials and institutions that would and
do perpetuate institutionally racist policies.”138 They argue that white
citizens are able to absolve themselves of blame because there is no
overt discrimination being committed, and for this white population
there is “no American dilemma.”139 The everyday lives of most white
middle-class and affluent families go on unmolested. Meanwhile, so
long as energy, transportation, cement, chemical, and other companies
produce hazardous pollution as a by-product of assuring that middle-
class and affluent lifestyle, the pollution and environmental risks must
go somewhere. It is politically inconceivable that this pollution will go
in the middle-class or affluent white neighborhoods. Importantly, it is
not politically inconceivable that these hazards would go to poor minor-
ity neighborhoods. It stands to reason that environmental justice will
be unattainable until poor minority neighborhoods have the same in-
trinsic (if not economic) value as wealthy white ones; the roots of
institutional racialization are exposed and changed; and political and
advocacy pressures lead to institutional changes in all three branches
of the federal government to recognize environmental justice concerns
and to establish effective mechanism to assure private citizens the
right to take action against any inequitable environmental injustice.
CONCLUSION
This article has set forth the proposition that federal institu-
tional action to implement disparate racial impact environmental
justice concerns is highly constrained. The Courts prohibited utiliza-
tion of § 602 regulations to create private rights of actions for disparate
racial impacts. The current legislative gridlock makes Congressional
action to create such private rights of action unlikely. The best hope for
137. Phillips, supra note 135, at 173.
138. CARMICHAEL, supra note 136, at 5.
139. Id. (Carmichael and Hamilton are referring to racial discrimination, which for the
majority of white citizens was not a problem to them and did not require dramatic
interventions. They further note that any real problem that came from the Civil Rights
Movement was a disruption to normal social activity and business).
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environmental justice advocacy may lie with agency actions. However,
executive agencies are also politically constrained and influenced by
Congressional funding, oversight, and presidential electoral result.
Even in administrations favorable to environmental concerns, agency
bureaucracies are slow to act; and countervailing political pressures
may be brought upon the agency to delay or weaken agency action.
Overarching the limitations to federal institution action set forth in
this article is the well-documented historical systemic racism that fur-
ther constrains institutional action, and makes any demand for reform
more difficult.
